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The Introduction of Guns to Japan 
    In 1543 a ship appeared, seemingly out of nowhere, off the coast of Tanegashima, an 
island about forty-four miles southeast of Kyushu.' More than a hundred people were aboard 
the ship, people of unusual appearance who spoke a language unintelligible to the inhabitants 
of Tanegashima. Among these sea borne visitors was a Chinese scholar who, by writing char-
acters in the sand, was able to communicate with one of the Tanegashima village chieftains. 
When the chieftain learned that the ship held passengers who were traders from the land of 
the "southern barbarians," he had the ship directed to the island's main harbor, where the 
traders were taken to see Lord Tokitaka, the daimyo of Tanegashima. 
    Two of these alien traders showed the Lord a tube-like object "two or three feet long, 
straight on the outside with a passage inside, and made of a heavy substance." Filling the 
tube with "powder and small lead pellets," they applied fire to its aperture and produced an 
"explosion ... like lightning ... [and a] report like thunder." The pellets flew from the tube 
and squarely struck a small white target erected by the traders. 
    Let us, for the moment, accept this story as true. If it is true, then the alien traders were 
Portuguese and the first Europeans, so far as we know, to set foot on Japanese soil. The tube 
they fired was probably an arquebus, and their display of its functioning before the Lord of 
Tanegashima marked, it has been supposed, the beginning of the history of guns in Japan. 
Here is George Sansom's (1883-1965) account, in his three-volume History ofJapan, of this 
introduction of European guns to Japan: 
      The muskets which they carried caused excitement among the rescuers, and for a 
     long time after this event the Japanese name for such firearmswas Tanegashima. 
     The weapons were soon copied in considerable numbers, but it would be a mistake 
     to suppose that the use of firearms at once brought abouta great change in meth-
     ods of warfare in Japan. For although they were used in the major battles of the 
      sixteenth century, they remained in scarce supply for a centuryor more, and they 
     did not displace traditional weapons-the sword, the bow, and the spear-until an 
       even later date.'
Sansom need not be criticized for stating that the first Portuguese brought muskets rather 
than arquebuses to Japan. Although it is believed (by those who accept the story as true) that 
the weapons shown to the Lord of Tanegashima were the smaller arquebuses, which were 
generally preferred by the Iberian peoples, the issue of "muskets or arquebuses?" is still a mat-
ter of debate. 
    Sansom's assertion that the use of firearms did not "at once [bring] about a great change 
in methods of warfare in Japan" 3 touches on a central question in the present-day study 
by historians of the role of guns in sixteenth-century Japan. Stated simply, the question is
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whether or not guns caused a revolution in Japanese warfare at this time. Inquiry into this 
question has been much stimulated, as I will shortly discuss, by one of the great issues in 
European historiography of the medieval and early modern ages, first articulated in the mid-
1950s, of whether the use of handguns on a large scale, beginning about the middle of the 
sixteenth century, caused a "military revolution" that accelerated the course of Europe's early 
modern age.' 
    Sansom's brief account of the introduction of European guns to Japan at this time, 
based on the Tanegashima story, is misleading, however, in at least one important respect. 
It says nothing about earlier Japanese experience with gunpowder and guns. The impression 
given is that they arrived with great suddenness right in the middle of Japan's tumultuous 
age of Sengoku (the Country at War, 1478-1568). In fact, gunpowder was invented by the 
Chinese as early as the ninth century,' and the Japanese were first exposed to its use during 
the Mongol Invasions of their country in 1274 and 1281. In a famous Japanese painting of 
the invasions, The Mongol Scroll (Moko shurai ekotoba), there is a vivid scene of a "bomb-
shell" (teppo) exploding over the head of a Japanese warrior charging toward the Mongol 
invaders. Joseph Needham (1900-1995) cites a record, dated 1287, only six years after the 
second Mongol invasion of Japan, that strongly suggests the use of some kind of "hand-gun" 
or "portable bombard" in battle.' He further speculates on the possibility that a primitive 
firearm he calls a "fire-barrel" may have been employed against the Japanese during the inva-
sions themselves. 
    Moving beyond such speculation, we find that the earliest reasonably reliable references 
to guns in Japan come from the late fifteenth century. A Buddhist priest recorded in his di-
ary in 1466, on the eve of the Onin War (1467-77), that a Ryukyuan official visiting the 
Ashikaga shogun in Kyoto fired a "teppo" in the air, perhaps as part of a ritual or as an act 
of celebration, that greatly startled the inhabitants of the capital. In 1468, the year after the 
Onin War began, the Eastern Army in that conflict used a "fire spear" that was probably a 
type of handgun.' 
    Teppo ki, the story of Tanegashima, was written in 1607, more than sixty years after the 
supposed arrival of the Portuguese traders there, to celebrate this great event in the history 
of the Tanegashima daimyo family. Although it has long been accepted as a reliable historical 
source, the book's value has recently been questioned for at least two reasons': (1) One must 
suspect the accuracy of any record of an event written sixty-plus years after the event itself, 
and (2) it seems surprising that Europeans would suddenly appear bearing the first guns to 
Japan in an age of great commercial activity in East and Southeast Asian waters that probably 
included considerable trade in gunpowder and non-European firearms. 
    The chronicle of the Hojo family of the Kanto, Hojogodai ki (Record of Five Generations 
of the Hojo Family), tells us that a gun-teppo-from China was presented to Ujitsuna 
(1487-154 1), the Hojo daimyo, by a monk in 1510. This gun may not, however, have been 
Chinese, but rather a weapon from Southeast Asia that was originally of Turkish design 
but had been modified at least several times as it was transmitted eastward from Turkey. 
There are other scattered accounts in the records of firearms-perhaps Chinese or Southeast 
Asian-in Japan before 1543,10 although none gives a clear idea of what these weapons may 
have been like. 
    The mid-sixteenth century witnessed a great upsurge in activity of the so-called WakO, 
or Japanese pirates. In fact, many, if not most, of the Wako by this time were probably Chi-
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nese rather than Japanese, and they very likely plied the waters of East and Southeast Asia in 
Chinese junks. If a Chinese junk landed at Tanegashima in 1543, it could well have been a 
Wako ship. As Udagawa Takehisa (b. 1943) points out, the Wako of this age were probably 
more traders than pirates. Udagawa goes so far as to suggest that the "Chinese scholar" in 
Teppo ki, whose name is given as Goho, was a well-known Wako leader whose real name (in 
the Japanese pronunciation) was Ochoku." 
    Both piracy and illicit trade were in large part the result of the Ming dynasty's prohi-
bition on overseas trade. With trade devolving into the hands of those private freebooters 
willing to defy Ming law, it is not surprising that these people should come into contact with 
the existing Wako bands and either employ them or merge with them, thus becoming Wako 
themselves. There may not be sufficient documentary material available to provide a full pic-
ture of how these processes occurred. But at the very least it seems likely that guns, perhaps of 
a variety of kinds, were brought to Japan by Wako or others before 1543.
Weaponry before the Gun 
    It is difficult to trace the history of weaponry in Japan before the gun because the re-
cords are sparse and at times misleading. Thus, for example, we can assume, as Kajiwara Ma-
saaki (1927-1998) points out, that all warriors or participants in battles in Heike monogatari 
(Tale of the Heike) are mounted warriors using the bow as their primary weapon. 12 As a war 
tale, the Heike cannot be accepted, of course, as a fully reliable primary source. But it is an 
important source and, if used carefully, can tell us a great deal about late twelfth-century war-
riors and warfare. In regard to the point that Kajiwara makes, however, the Heike is probably 
misleading, because many of the participants in the battles of the Genpei War appear to have 
fought on foot and used other weapons, including polearms (naginata) and swords, as well 
as the bow." Fighters on foot in battles during earlier centuries can be found, for example, 
in such narrative scrolls (emakimono) as Zen-kunen kassen ekotoba (Scroll of the Former Nine 
Years War) and Go-sannen kassen ekotoba (Scroll of the Later Three Years War). Fighters on 
foot can also be observed, although not in great number, even in the famous Heiji monogatari 
ekotoba (Tale of the Heiji Scroll). Although these scrolls were painted long after the events 
they depict and therefore cannot be taken as absolute evidence of anything, they at least sug-
gest the possibility-if not likelihood-that men fought on foot as well as on horseback in 
battles of the ancient age. 
    There seems to be no question that the bow, whether wielded by men on horseback or 
foot, was the primary weapon of battle until at least the sixteenth century. The way it was 
used, however, appears to have changed from the fourteenth century. Whereas until that 
time mounted archers for the most part fired at each other from fairly close range in the tra-
ditional "one-against-one" (ikki-uchi) style of combat, during the fourteenth century archers 
in battle tended to maintain a greater distance from each other and shoot their arrows from 
afar. Because they traversed greater distances to reach their targets, arrows caused many more 
wounds than deaths: that is, the ratio of wounds-to-deaths by arrows increased dramatically. 
Thomas Conlan, in his study of fourteenth-century warfare, cites the extreme case of one 
Imagawa Yorikuni, who withstood nineteen arrow wounds before succumbing to the twen-
tieth. In many cases a warrior's armor was sufficient to stop "tens" of arrows shot from, say, 
one hundred yards away."
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    The weapon that was second in importance to the bow in the fourteenth century was 
the sword. One way to estimate the frequency of use and relative efficacy of all weapons in 
warfare is to tabulate the numbers of wounds and deaths caused by each as recorded in the 
petitions for rewards (gunchujo) that warriors submitted to their commanders after battles. 
Tabulating wounds by weapons found in the existing fourteenth-century petitions, Conlan 
estimates that about three-quarters of wounds were caused by arrows and about one-third or 
less by swords. (The percentage of wounds inflicted by spears or pikes, yari, and rocks [which 
were usually thrown by defenders during the sieges of fortifications] was negligible) i5 
    The frequent use of swords during fourteenth-century warfare does not necessarily 
mean there was a great deal of "hand-to-hand" fighting with armies locked in close combat. 
In fact, the number of close encounters declined throughout the century in tandem with the 
trend toward fighting from a distance, as just discussed in regard to the changing use of the 
bow in battle. The following remarks by Conlan tell us much about swords and how they 
were used in fourteenth-century warfare:
     The prevalence of sword wounds in the fourteenth century does not indicate that 
     warriors fought in tightly massed groups. Rather, swords were better suited for 
      conflicts among widely scattered clusters of men. Some swords reached seven feet 
     in length and were useful in breaking the legs of charging horses. A few long swords 
     (odachi) were only partially sharpened, with half of the blade near the hilt blunt 
     and rounded like a "clam shell," which indicates that they were used to bludgeon 
     opponents instead of slashing them." 
    One surprising conclusion arrived at by Conlan in his study is that the spear was little 
used in fourteenth-century warfare, at least as judged by the rarity with which it appears as 
the weapon responsible for wounds in the petitions for reward. This conclusion flies in the 
face of the general belief that the fourteenth century saw the first formation of infantry units 
and the equipping of those units primarily with spears. 17 In this regard, let me quote a few 
more statements from Conlan:
     Fourteenth century battle was fought by widely scattered troops. Most warring 
      consisted of skirmishing.... Even in the fiercest battles, only a few mustered the 
      courage to fight hand-to-hand..... he onset of indeterminate warfare did not lead 
     to any changes in tactics. Squads of cavalry dominated the battlefield.... [T]he 
     prevalence of long swords and the paucity of pike (spear) wounds indicates that no 
      "massed" infantry formations existed in the fourteenth century. 18 
    Suzuki Masaya (b. 1936), studying late fifteenth- and sixteenth-century warfare, con-
firms that two related trends identified by Conlan in the fourteenth century continued in 
the centuries that followed: (1) most warfare was conducted by warriors who did not come 
together in close combat but fought while separated by a considerable distance from one 
another and employed such "distance weapons" as arrows, rocks (and other objects that could 
be "thrown" or launched as projectiles), and, later, guns; and (2) battles produced a much 
higher percentage of wounds over deaths. Suzuki's data on wounds in battle for the period 
1501-60 (just before the time when guns came to be used regularly in battle) reveals that 
75.2 % were caused by arrows, stones, and other thrown objects and 22.9 % by spears and 
swords.19 This division into roughly three-fourths of wounds caused by "distance weapons"
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and one-fourth by "close up weapons" is strikingly similar to Conlan's arrows and swords ra-
tio. The main difference, of course, is that Suzuki groups stones and other objects with arrows 
and spears with swords. 
    Imatani Akira (b. 1942), discussing the rise in importance of the spear as a weapon 
of war from at least the Onin War, suggests, however, that there may have been more close 
combat and more fatalities in warfare during the Onin-Sengoku age than Suzuki acknowl-
edges. He claims that, until the arrival of guns in the mid-sixteenth century, the spear was 
the principal weapon of the ashigaru units that formed the infantry components of armies; 
and he cites a battle in 1547 between Miyoshi Nagayoshi (1522-1564) and Yusa Naganori 
during which a clash between spearmen from both armies left 2,000 dead. Although Imatani 
does not specify what kind of spears were used in this battle, he observes in the same discus-
sion that spears were made longer and longer and that some even reached about eighteen feet 
in length (Oda Nobunaga [1534-1582] became especially well-known for the eighteen-foot 
spears carried by some of his ashigaru). It is difficult to imagine how an eighteen-foot spear 
could actually be wielded effectively in battle. But Imatani claims that long spears helped 
reduce the fear of ashigaru and other fighters of being forced into very close combat.20
A Military Revolution? 
    In a lecture delivered in 1955, Michael Roberts (1908-1997) enunciated what has be-
come probably the most important interpretation of the role of military history in the mak-
ing of early modern Europe. It is an interpretation that, although modified and in some cases 
rejected by others, has dominated the thinking of military historians during the intervening 
half-century." In brief, Roberts asserted that there occurred in the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries a military revolution that accelerated or perhaps even caused the forma-
tion of Europe's early modern, absolutist states. The revolution centered on the use of guns, 
especially hand-operated guns, on a truly large scale for the first time. Peasants and others 
of the lower orders, who could readily learn to use guns (as compared to bows and arrows, 
spears/pikes), were recruited to form ever-larger infantry units that, disciplined and trained in 
ways unknown in the preceding medieval centuries, became the nuclei of what can be called 
early modern armies. 
    In the largest sense, the idea of a military revolution causally links the simultaneous ap-
pearance in history of the early modern state and the gun-based army. This linking has been 
a boon to military historians who, so often pushed to the sidelines by historians who insist 
on social, economic, and political explanations for the "progress" of history, now find their 
discipline at the center of historical analysis. The military historian can even argue that the 
military component was the most important in the phenomenon of state formation in the 
early modern age. 
    Whatever the truth about exactly when Western-style guns were introduced to Japan, 
they were certainly available to the Japanese in relatively large numbers by the second half 
of the sixteenth century-in other words, just about the time when, according to Michael 
Roberts, these same guns became the catalyst for a military revolution in Europe. The obvious 
question, then, is whether Japan also had a military revolution caused by guns at about the 
same time as Europe. Guns were eagerly sought by the Sengoku daimyo, who readily appreci-
ated their value; and they were effectively-sometimes decisively-used in battle by the more
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prominent daimyo, including Oda Nobunaga, who led the way to unification of the country 
in the century's final decades. In short, Japan appears to have had, at roughly the same time, 
a military revolution similar to Europe's. 
    Little about the idea of a military revolution has appeared in the English-language lit-
erature on sixteenth-century Japan. The major exception is Stephen Morillo's article "Guns 
and Government: A Comparative Study of Europe and Japan," which appeared in the Spring 
1995 issue of the journal of World History. A scholar of European history, Morillo turns to the 
case of Japan in quest of an answer to the question of which came first in Europe's military 
revolution, guns or government: that is, did the gun-based army give rise to the early modern 
state or did the creation of a gun-based army, with its attendant costs, require the prior forma-
tion of a strong, early modern state? Morillo believes that Japan provides a kind of laboratory 
case for study, because European guns were introduced at a precise time: 1543 (a date based, 
of course, on acceptance of the Tanegashima story). Stated simply, if there was a strong (i.e., 
early modern) government in Japan before 1543, it acquired its strength without the benefit 
of guns. If, on the other hand, there was no strong government, then guns were presumably 
a principal, if not the principal, factor in the creation of the Oda, Toyotomi, and Tokugawa 
early modern regimes. 
    Without going further into Morillo's argument, let me summarize by saying that he 
believes that, in the case of Japan (and probably also Europe), strong government came before 
guns. Of course, Japan in the mid-1500s had no strong central government. On the contrary, 
it was fragmented into warring daimyo domains. But Morillo believes that a number of the 
daimyo domains, such as Nobunaga's in Owari, had strong governments that were able to 
handle the cost of acquiring guns and training large armies centered on gun-bearing infantry 
units. With these (early modern?) armies, leading daimyo were able to set out on the road to 
unification. 
    At least one Japanese scholar, Suzuki Masaya, emphatically rejects the military revolu-
tion theory. Citing more statistics on battle casualties during the sixteenth century, Suzuki 
argues that guns, which certainly became the most important weapon in late sixteenth- and 
early seventeenth-century warfare, in fact merely contributed to the long-term tendency to-
ward distance fighting.22 In other words, they did not cause a revolution but helped sustain 
an evolutionary process. Suzuki's argument seems to be based on a rather narrow view of how 
guns may or may not have transformed warfare, and neglects such things as the sheer physi-
cal power they introduced to fighting and their role in prompting commanders to undertake 
greater organization of and institute stricter discipline among their forces. Organization and 
discipline are, after all, two of the hallmarks of early modern and modem armies; and we 
see, I would argue, significant organization and discipline in, for example, the gun units of 
uniformed men firing in unison that appear in a number of the battle screens (kassen byobu) 
depicting late sixteenth-century warfare. 23
Early Modern Warfare in Japan 
    1568, the year that Nobunaga entered Kyoto and began unification, is generally rec-
ognized by historians as the starting point of Japan's early modern age (1568-1868). The re-
mainder of this paper will deal with Nobunaga's style of early modern warfare during the first 
decades of this age. Nobunaga was, in fact, a transitional figure in Japanese military history.
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In many respects his way of war was a continuation of that of the typical Sengoku daimyo of 
the preceding century (Nobunaga himself was a Sengoku daimyo who became a unifier). But 
he was also an innovator who raised warfare to a new level of intensity, destructiveness, and 
success. In so doing he set the stage for Hideyoshi (1537-1598) and Ieyasu (1543-1616), 
who became the great captains of Japan's early modern warfare at its peak at the end of the 
sixteenth century. 
    There is no simple definition of early modern warfare in Japan, and we should be care-
ful in making comparisons with warfare in early modern Europe. Conditions in Europe were 
vastly different from those of Japan in their respective early modern ages, even though these 
ages overlapped chronologically and Europeans were in Japan at the time. The only major 
contribution of Europeans to Japan's early modern warfare was the gun, and we have already 
observed that the gun's significance as a weapon of war to the sixteenth-century Japanese is 
still a matter of dispute among scholars. I will return to this subject later with commentary 
on Nobunaga as a user of guns in battle during the century's latter half. 
    One of the most distinctive features of Japan's early modern warfare was the increasingly 
important role played by forts. Whereas open-field, pitched battles were by far the most com-
mon form of organized fighting in earlier centuries, in the sixteenth century forts sprang up 
everywhere and battling usually involved attacking and trying to take them. Nobunaga, for 
example, fought relatively few open-field battles. The great majority of his armed encounters 
involved either attacking enemies in forts or defending against enemy attacks on his forts. 
Unfortunately, we do not have much detailed information about these forts; but since most 
of them seem to have fallen quite readily to enemy attack during Nobunaga's time, we can 
assume that they were not constructed to withstand severe and prolonged assault. There were, 
of course, exceptions,24 and Nobunaga himself took the lead in inaugurating the great age of 
castle-building with the erection of his principal fortress at Azuchi on Lake Biwa in the late 
1570s. But Nobunaga was assassinated (in 1582) before these massive, stone-based structures 
assumed a central role in warfare. It was left to Hideyoshi and Ieyasu to develop the strategy, 
tactics, and technology necessary to deal with castle warfare. 
    In addition to guns and forts, early modern warfare in Japan was characterized by: the 
formation of standing armies, including organized and disciplined infantries divided into 
units by weaponry (e.g., gunners, spearmen, bowmen) ;25 the creation of leagues or alliances 
that made possible fighting on a much larger geographical scale than before; year-round 
campaigning (most of Sengoku warfare was seasonal); and a quantum increase in brutality, 
including the wanton slaughter of the vanquished. Let us turn now to Nobunaga's style of 
early modern warfare.
Nobunaga and the Beginning of Military Unification 
    Knowledge of Nobunaga's military career comes primarily from one source: the Shincho-
ko ki (Chronicle of Lord Nobunaga) of Ota Gyuichi (1527-1610?). Gyuichi, who was born 
in 1527 in Nobunaga's province of Owari, was trained at a Buddhist temple as a youth, a 
fact that probably accounts for his skill as a writer. 26 He joined Nobunaga's army sometime 
in the mid-1550s as a foot soldier (ashigaru) specializing in the use of the bow and arrow. 
The recipient of praise and a landed fief for his performance in battle, he rose to become a 
member of one of Nobunaga's elite guards (a unit using bows and arrows). After a long career
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as a combat soldier, he entered military administration; and following Nobunaga's death he 
served several other warrior lords, including Hideyoshi and his son Hideyori (1593-1615), 
in various capacities. 
    Recognized by scholars as a rich and reliable primary source, Shincho-ko ki (hereafter, 
SK) is a detailed account of Nobunaga's career, especially as a military commander, from the 
time of his coming-of-age in 1546 until his assassination in 1582. Fujimoto Masayuki (b. 
1948) has made particularly excellent use of this work in his study of Nobunaga the military 
commander, Nobunaga no Sengoku gunji gaku (Nobunaga's Military Learning in the Sengoku 
Era). 
    Nobunaga became commander of the Oda upon the death of his father in 1551. For the 
remainder of the decade he strove-successfully-to bring order to his own house, which had 
long been sundered by internal dispute. During this time he displayed the ruthlessness that 
was to mark him as a commander by murdering his younger brother, whom he suspected of 
treachery. In fact, fratricide was not uncommon during the Sengoku age, which frequently 
witnessed brothers killing brothers, sons killing fathers, and fathers killing sons. 
    Rise of the Infantry. One of the most important developments in warfare during the Sen-
goku age, as observed, was the rise of the infantry in armies. By Nobunaga's time, the infantry 
had become dominant in battle, taking the place of the cavalry as an army's premier fighting 
arm. This development was noted even by a contemporary foreign observer, the Jesuit Francis 
Xavier (1506-1552), who remarked: "They [the Japanese] are excellent archers and fight on 
foot, although there are horses in the country."27 
    SK and other written records say little about the actual numbers of troops engaged in 
battles,28 and even less about whether they fought on foot or on horseback. Thus we must 
look elsewhere in the attempt to estimate how many men in a typical army in Nobunaga's 
day were infantry. At least a tentative estimate of infantry size can be made from study of the 
battle screens that depict sixteenth-century armies and their encounters. One of these is the 
Kawanakajima kassen zu byobu (Screens Illustrating the Battle of Kawanakajima),29 which 
comprises two eight-panel screens, the right one showing the army ofTakeda Shingen (1521-
1573) in battle formation and the left portraying that army in combat at Kawanakajima in 
Shinano province in 1561 against the army of Uesugi Kenshin (1530-1578).30 
    The Kawanakajima Screens were probably painted about the middle of the seventeenth 
century, nearly a century after the events they depict." Hence, they are not primary sources. 
But we are not interested in the actual story they tell about the 1561 battle, which has been 
fictionalized, but rather in the general information they provide about how the battle's par-
ticipants fought. This information, we may hypothesize, is likely to have been transmitted 
through the generations without great distortion, since it does not deal directly with the 
tactics, strategy, and outcome of the battle-that is, with those things that most concerned 
the descendants of the Takeda and Uesugi families and their Tokugawa-period schools of 
military study and that came to be described in differing versions by both sets of families and 
schools. 
    With this in mind, let us look at the Kawanakajima Screens, beginning with Shingen's 
army in pre-battle formation on the right screen. The size of the army is merely suggestive. I 
estimate that a thousand or more men are depicted on the screen, whereas in fact Shingen is 
thought to have led some 16,000 men into the 1561 battle.32 Our concern, however, is not 
with the precise numbers but the percentages of men on foot and on horseback. In general,
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Shingen's army is arrayed on the screen in linear formation and comprises fifteen or sixteen 
lines or their equivalent. Of these lines, only one consists primarily of horsemen. There are 
also horsemen scattered elsewhere in the army, but they are clearly the commanders of infan-
try units. In short, only a small fraction of the men in the right screen of the Kawanakajima 
Screens-perhaps four or five percent of the total-are mounted. Shingen's army, as shown, 
is overwhelmingly an army on foot. 
    It is possible that many, if not most, of the relatively few warriors on horseback in 
armies like Shingen's at Kawanakajima in 1561 and Nobunaga's before and after that date dis-
mounted when entering battle. Thus we find Nobunaga himself at the Battle of Okehazama 
"
getting off his horse and contending with his wakamusha (young warriors) to take the lead in 
the battle, spearing enemies and striking them down."33 The fighting at Okehazama occurred 
when Imagawa Yoshimoto (1519-1560) invaded Owari in 1560. With only some 5,000 
troops, Nobunaga was able to defeat the invading army estimated at 40,000. In the process 
he killed the Imagawa commander, Yoshimoto, and advanced himself as a leading contender 
to unify the country. 
    The left screen of the Kawanakajima pair shows various scenes from the 1561 clash of 
Takeda and Uesugi, including the famous, but apocryphal, one-on-one encounter between 
Kenshin and Shingen, with Kenshin wielding a sword from horseback and Shingen, on foot, 
parrying the sword with his gunpai (military fan) . This screen is interesting for what it tells 
us (or, rather, suggests to us, since it was painted a century later) about the weapons used at 
Kawanakajima in 1561. Although there are units of gunners and archers on the right screen 
(Shingen's pre-battle formation), I can discern no men with guns and only a few archers in 
the combat depicted on the left screen. Nearly all of the fighting is being done by troops, 
largely on foot, armed with spears and swords; and of these two weapons, spears are by far 
the more prevalent. 
    Another set of battle screens that indicates the great extent to which armies had become 
infantry armies by this age is the Shizugatake kassen zu byobu (Screens Illustrating the Battle 
of Shizugatake).34 Comprising two six-panel screens, this set illustrates the clash between 
Hideyoshi and Shibata Katsuie (1530-83) in 1583 as these two chieftains vied to become the 
successor as unifier to Nobunaga, who was assassinated in 1582. The left screen shows the first 
day of the battle in which forces under the Shibata prevail, seizing two of Hideyoshi's forts.35 
On the right screen, depicting the second day, Hideyoshi himself has taken the field as com-
mander of his army and achieves victory by driving the enemy into full-scale retreat. 
    There are hundreds of combatant figures on the Shizugatake screens, yet only about 
fifteen are mounted on horses. Both of the field commanders, Hideyoshi and Sakuma Mori-
masa (1554-1583, a Shibata lieutenant), are on foot. In other words, as depicted in the 
Shizugatake Screens, the Battle of Shizugatake was almost exclusively a contest between in-
fantries. And, as in the Kawanakajima Screens, most of the fighting was done with spears. 
There are clusters of gunners and archers firing from the ramparts of the forts, but nearly all 
of the many troops battling in the open fields are wielding spears. 
    Nobunaga's Strategy and Battle Tactics. Nobunaga's victory over Imagawa Yoshimoto in 
1560 has gone down in Japanese military history as one of the great victories achieved by sur-
prise attack (kishu kogeki). Nobunaga, with his much smaller force, is thought to have fallen 
suddenly and without warning upon the Imagawa army while it was bivouacking. Aided by 
a cloudburst that masked his approach, Nobunaga took the Imagawa completely by surprise.
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Fujimoto Masayuki insists that there are no credible records to prove that Nobunaga's attack 
was actually a kishu kogeki, but for centuries it has been regarded as one and, indeed, as the 
classic example. Thus, in the days before Pearl Harbor in 1941, Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku 
(1884-1943) and many other Japanese military leaders referred to Okehazama in their letters 
and diaries as they planned their surprise attack on the United States. For them, Okehazama 
was a synonym for a sudden, unannounced attack.36 
    Whether or not Nobunaga defeated the Imagawa with a surprise attack at Okehazama, 
he did not use that tactic during the remainder of his military career. Wherever possible, he 
tried to engage the enemy with a force greater than his.37 But he also sought to avoid deci-
sive battles that were likely to be costly in men and materiel. He was a master of the art of 
Sengoku-style diplomacy and negotiation .38 In attacking forts, for example, he often tried to 
persuade or force the commander to surrender, frequently by devious means, including the 
use of undercover agents and turncoats. Thus, in the seventh month of 1573, Nobunaga, 
with the assistance of his lieutenant Hideyoshi, persuaded two of the three commanders of 
Yodo fortress in Yamashiro province to pledge loyalty to him and turn against the third. The 
latter, betrayed by his comrades, attempted to flee but was cut down by a retainer of another 
of Nobunaga's lieutenants.39 Nobunaga took Fort Ibaraki in Settsu province by similar means 
in the eleventh month of 1578. In this case one of three commanders, having secretly com-
mitted to Nobunaga, suddenly opened the gates of the fort in the middle of a stormy night 
to allow Nobunaga's troops to enter and force the other two commanders and their followers 
into disorganized flight.40 
    Treachery and betrayal were commonplace in Nobunaga's time, and spies were every-
where. Whereas Nobunaga himself was expert at using spies and enlisting turncoats, he was 
also alert to those who might be employed by the enemy. On the eve of the Battle of Oke-
hazama, for example, he refused to talk strategy when his commanders met with him in what 
was supposed to be a war council. Instead, he prattled on about irrelevant matters. When the 
commanders were returning to their quarters later, they agreed that Nobunaga was a fool.41 
But Nobunaga had been concerned that one of his commanders might be a spy or turncoat 
who would report his plans to the enemy (Imagawa Yoshimoto). 
    We have noted that much of Nobunaga's fighting involved attacking and defending 
forts. Forts were ubiquitous in sixteenth-century Japan, varying in quality from those that 
could hold out against prolonged sieges and were the forerunners of the great castles con-
structed in the last decades of the century to flimsy, hastily built defensive positions. Takeda 
Shingen's father, Nobutora (1493-1573), destroyed no less than thirty-six of the flimsy type 
of forts in one day while campaigning in Shinano province in 1540.42 Among the stronger 
forts was the Odani fortress of the Asai in Omi province, which was not only substantially 
built but also benefited from its location atop a mountain.43 Even after Nobunaga, with 
Tokugawa Ieyasu's help, had defeated the combined forces of the Asai and Asakura at the 
Battle of Anegawa in 1570 and had chased the Asai back to Odani, he was obliged to halt his 
pursuit because the fortress "would be difficult to take in a single assault."44 
    The above reference to forts that could hold out against prolonged sieges requires fur-
ther comment. During the Sengoku period most battles were brief, lasting a day or less. Cam-
paigns-for example, a daimyo's foray with his army into the domain of a neighbor (such as 
Imagawa Yoshimoto's invasion of Owari in 1560 that ended in the Battle of Okehazama)-
were also usually brief The main reason for the brevity of campaigns was that armies, largely
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recruited from the peasantry, could not afford to stay away too long, especially during the 
planting and harvesting seasons. This was also the principal reason why there were so few 
prolonged sieges in Sengoku. A daimyo could not risk a siege of any significant duration for 
fear that his soldiers would start deserting and return to their villages and farms." 
    All this began to change during Nobunaga's drive toward unification. Many of his cam-
paigns continued for months at a time, and it was not unusual for him to dispatch lieuten-
ants, such as Hideyoshi and Shibata Katsuie, to seek and engage the enemy in one region 
while he campaigned in another. In other words, the intensity and scale of warfare increased 
considerably, largely because armies were becoming more and more assemblies of regular or 
fulltime officers and men." In the case of the officers, they were steadily drawn into castle 
towns (jokarnachi), where they were permanently on call to their daimyos. With these early 
modern armies, commanders found the siege to be a more viable military strategy. Thus 
Hideyoshi, campaigning to extend Nobunaga's authority into western Honshu from the late 
1577s until Nobunaga's death in 1582, conducted several lengthy sieges, including one in 
Harima province against Fort Miki, which held out against him for more than a year. This 
was the first stage in Hideyoshi's rise to fame as master of the siege in Japan's short age of 
castle warfare.47 
    In his campaigning, Nobunaga captured or destroyed many of the forts he attacked (as 
described in SK) quite efficiently, often needing only one day or less per fort. In some cases 
he took forts in clusters. One of his most effective tools in softening up forts for attack was 
fire. Time and again we read in SK of his army "burning down villages here and there" as 
they approached a fort. In preparing to attack Fort Konda in Kawachi province in 1574.4, 
for example, Nobunaga sent men out "to set fire to valley after valley." While engaged in this 
arsonous activity, they also cut down and discarded all the crops they came across.48 Once 
the fields and villages around a fort had been denuded and/or put to the torch, it became, in 
the parlance of SK, a "naked fort" (hadakajiro).49 This was both economic and psychological 
warfare. It was economic warfare because it eliminated the nearest sources of food to which 
a fort's defenders had access when they were not directly under attack or siege;50 and it was 
psychological warfare because in many, if not most, cases the defenders of forts were recruited 
primarily from nearby villages, the very villages, containing their homes, that were being 
destroyed. 
    As in the Sengoku age, there continued to be considerable instability in both warrior 
and soldier relations (referring to the officers [samurai] as warriors and recruited peasants 
as soldiers) during the time of Nobunaga and unification. Vassal warriors frequently aban-
doned or rebelled against their lords. Soldiers also often absconded and sometimes betrayed 
their commanders. We see such betrayal, for example, in the case of Fort Uetsuki in Harima 
province, which Hideyoshi encircled and laid siege to in 1577.11. After seven days of siege, 
the men of the fort turned against their commander, took his head, and pleaded for mercy. 
But Nobunaga, as Hideyoshi's superior, refused mercy; instead, he had them all crucified." 
On other occasions, however, Nobunaga not only allowed those who surrendered forts to go 
free but also incorporated them into his army. Often the quid pro quo for allowing a fort's 
occupants to go free was the suicide of their commander. 
    So omnipresent were forts in most of Nobunaga's battles, as depicted in SK, that warfare 
of the time can almost be described as a game of "fort monopolj' in which opposing forces 
took and lost forts. In preparing to attack an enemy fort, a commander like Nobunaga often
116 Paul VARLEY
constructed a "facing fort" (mukai jo) from which to send forth his men; or he built one or 
more "annex forts" (tsuke jiro), which I interpret (from the way they are described in SK) to 
be forts designed to contend for physical control of the land on which the enemy's fort was 
situated. In one of his many forays against the great Ishiyama Honganji Temple, which held 
out against him for a decade (1570-80), Nobunaga in 1576.5 ordered the construction of no 
less than ten annex forts throughout the Osaka region.52 Often he assigned leading lieuten-
ants to hold annex forts as well as enemy forts once they were taken. 
    We noted above Nobunaga's refusal of mercy to the defenders of a fort who surrendered 
to him and his decision, instead, to crucify them. Nobunaga has the reputation as perhaps the 
most cruel and brutal warrior in Japanese history. This reputation rests in large part on his de-
struction in 1571 of the great temple complex of Enryakuji on Mt. Hiei, which refused either 
to support him or to remain neutral as he battled against his enemies in the central provinces, 
especially the Asakura and Asai. Here is a partial description by the Jesuit Luis Frois of Nobu-
naga's destruction of Enryakuji and murder of all its monks and priests as well as townspeople 
from villages at the base of Mt. Hiei who had sought refuge on the mountain: 
      The bonzes began to resist [Nobunaga's army] with their weapons and wounded 
      about 150 soldiers. But they were unable to withstand such a furious assault and 
      were all put to the sword, together with the men, women and children of Saka-
      moto, which is near the foot of the mountain.... Then Nobunaga ordered a large 
      number of musketeers to go out into the hills and woods as if on a hunt; should 
     they find any bonzes hiding there, they were not to spare the life of a single one of 
     them. And this they duly did." 
    Ghastly as the slaughter on Mt. Hiei was, it may have been exceeded in both numbers 
and cruelty by Nobunaga's destruction of several forts defended by Pure Land adherents at 
Nagashima in Ise province in 1574. When the occupants of one of the forts, their food ex-
hausted after two months of siege, pleaded for mercy, Nobunaga refused and said he intended 
to see them starve to death (many already had). Meanwhile, he burned another of the forts 
to the ground, incinerating everyone within. The forts contained people of both sexes and 
all ages. In total, Nobunaga is said to have slaughtered as many as 20,000 members of the 
Nagashima confederacy at this time.54 
    Countless other casesof brutality and atrocity by Nobunaga can be found in the pages 
of SK. In 1571.9, for example, he attacked Shimura Fort in Omi province from four direc-
tions with great force, smashed his way into the fort and took 670 heads." And after captur-
ing Fort Ibaraki in Settsu province by deception in 1578, as already discussed, Nobunaga and 
his army entered nearby Hyogo province and "slaughtered people without regard to whether 
they were priests or laypeople, men or women. They put everything to the torch, including 
temple buildings, and Buddhist statues and sutras. Smoke promptly rose up above the clouds. 
They then continued on to Ichinotani in Harima province, burning and burning."56 
    The Battle of Nagashino. If there was a military revolution in sixteenth-century Japan 
resulting from the use of handguns on a large scale, some would say that it began at the 
Battle of Nagashino in Mikawa province in 1575.5 between a combined force of Oda and 
Tokugawa against Takeda. This great battle has been visualized with great dramatic flair by 
Kurosawa Akira (1910-1998) in the movie Kagemusha (The Shadow Warrior), which por-
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trays Nagashino as a decisive victory of Oda-Tokugawa guns (the new) over Takeda cavalry 
(the old). In staging Kagemusha, Kurosawa did not simply engage in fanciful exaggeration. He 
adhered quite closely to what had long been accepted by scholars and others as the standard 
version (teisetsu) of how the battle was conducted. 
    According to this standard version, Nobunaga in his victory at Nagashino almost single-
handedly effected the military revolution. Erecting wooden palisades (saku) to stop or at least 
slow down the Takeda cavalry's charging horses, he deployed some 3,000 gunners armed with 
arquebuses or muskets and divided them into three ranks of 1,000 each. When the Takeda 
attacked, the ranks of gunners fired in order. Thus, as one rank fired, the second made final 
preparations to fire (the guns were muzzle-loading weapons that required time to reload), and 
the third, having just fired, began to re-load. The historical significance of this form of volley 
fire as given in the standard version of the Battle of Nagashino has been recognized even by 
military historians of Europe. Thus, for example, we find these remarks by Geoffrey Parker 
(b. 1943) in The Military Revolution: 
     [At the Battle of Nagashino the] warlord Oda Nobunaga deployed 3000 muske-
      teers in ranks in this action, having trained them to fire in volleys so as to maintain 
      a constant barrage. The opposing [Takeda] cavalry ... was annihilated.
     [The] crucial defect of the muzzle-loading musket: the length of time required to 
      recharge it.... [The] only way to overcome this disadvantage was to draw up mus-
     keteers in ranks, firing in sequence, so that the front file could reload while the oth-
     ers behind fired. This solution was not even suggested in Europe until 1594, and it 
     did not pass into general use there until the 1630s. Yet Oda Nobunaga had experi-
     mented with musketry salvoes in the 1560s, and he achieved his first major victory 
     with the technique in 1575, twenty years before the European innovation.57 
    Here is George Sansom's description of the Battle of Nagashino, which he hails as hav-
ing marked "a new era in the history of warfare in Japan": 
     Takeda opened the attack with the old-style order of battle: four waves of mounted 
     warriors charged one after another against the defences erected by Nobunaga. They 
     were all destroyed before they reached his front line. Nobunaga had set up wooden 
     palisades in a zig-zag pattern, of a height which the horses could not overleap. 
     Takeda's cavaliers were brought up short against this obstacle and were shot down 
     from behind it by some 3000 foot soldiers armed with muskets." 
    The Battle of Nagashino was the culmination of a lengthy campaign by the Takeda into 
the domains of the Tokugawa and Oda, possibly with the ultimate aim of marching on to 
Kyoto and seizing the initiative to unify the country from Nobunaga. Beginning in 1571, the 
redoubtable Takeda Shingen led his army into the provinces of Totomi (Tokugawa), Mikawa 
(Tokugawa), and Mino (Oda). Most of the fighting between Shingen and his enemies in 
these provinces centered-as so much of the warfare of this age did-on forts, although there 
was one major open-field battle at Mikatagahara in Totomi in the twelfth month of 1573 in 
which Shingen soundly defeated Ieyasu's army, which had been supplemented by a unit sent 
from Nobunaga. One scholar has declared Mikatagahara to be the worst defeat ever suffered
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by Ieyasu.sn 
    Riding the wave of his victory at Mikatagahara, Shingen in the early months of 1573 
advanced westward from Totomi into Mikawa and even dispatched a separate force to probe 
into Nobunaga's province of Mino. Seeking to rally support from allies, including Asakura 
Yoshikage (1533-1573) and the shogun, Ashikaga Yoshiaki (1537-1597), who, estranged 
from Nobunaga, had long sought to create an anti-Oda coalition, Shingen was clearly plan-
ning a major assault against Nobunaga. But in the fourth month he suddenly fell ill and died 
in the field even as he tried to return to his home in Kai province. 
    Shingen was succeeded as Takeda leader by his son Katsuyori (1546-1582), who has 
been described as a "wild boar commander"-that is, a commander whose extreme aggres-
siveness and single-minded determination to press the offensive in battle was likely to lead 
to disaster, as in fact it did at Nagashino. In 1574 Katsuyori renewed his father's campaign, 
advancing into and attacking positions in Totomi, Mikawa, and Mino provinces. In the fifth 
month he scored an important victory when he laid siege to and, within three weeks, cap-
tured Ieyasu's Takatenjin Fort in Totomi. As Owada Tetsuo (b. 1944) has suggested, the 
capture of this fort must have been particularly satisfying to Katsuyori, because his father, 
under whose giant shadow Katsuyori had long languished, had failed to take Takatenjin three 
years earlier." 
    Successful in Totomi, Katsuyori crossed into Mikawa in 1575. His goal was to retake 
Nagashino Fort, which Ieyasu had seized from the Takeda in 1573. On 157 .5.13 and 14 
Katsuyori surrounded the fort, which was situated at the confluence of two rivers. The fort's 
occupants defended themselves stoutly even as they dispatched a plea to Ieyasu for help. 
Ieyasu, fearful that he could not deal with Katsuyori alone, called upon Nobunaga for ad-
ditional support, and on the eighteenth of the month a combined Oda-Tokugawa army 
took up positions at Shidaragahara (Shidara Field) some thirty kilometers west of Nagashino. 
Nobunaga's strategy was to harass the Takeda troops besieging Nagashino Fort and, at the 
same time, induce Katsuyori and his main army to attack the Oda-Tokugawa positions at 
Shidara Field. 
    In the early morning hours of 5.21, an Oda force stealthily approached Nagashino Fort 
from the south under cover of darkness, broke through the Takeda fortifications surround-
ing the fort and, joined by the fort's defenders, drove the Takeda besiegers to flight. With 
his encirclement of Nagashino Fort thus broken, Katsuyori, commanding the main Takeda 
army to the north of the fort, advanced toward Shidara Field to confront Nobunaga and 
Ieyasu-precisely in accordance with Nobunaga's strategy. 
    Shidara Field is a north-south valley bordered on either side by mountainous ridges and 
bisected by the Rengo River. Nobunaga and Ieyasu had carefully established their fortifica-
tions, including palisades to deter charging horses, on the western ridge, and Katsuyori and his 
army took up their positions on the eastern ridge. By some estimates, Nobunaga had 30,000 
troops and Ieyasu 8,000 (a combined total of 38,000) and Takeda Katsuyori had 15,000. But 
Owada Tetsuo believes that the actual totals were about half of these numbers." 
    An impartial military analyst, studying in advance the configuration of the land and 
the positions of the two armies at Shidara Field, would probably have concluded that attack 
was unwise for either side. It is all the more astonishing that the one who chose to attack was 
Katsuyori, outnumbered more than two to one. Perhaps Katsuyori was unaware of the great
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disparity in numbers between his army and the enemy's, or was encouraged to attack because 
of the belief that the enemy's ranks would soon be swelled to even greater size by reinforce-
ments. But Katsuyori also appears to have regarded Nobunaga and Ieyasu with disdain for 
taking up a defensive position with no intention of attacking: he would show them how a 
real warrior fought." There are many examples in history of foolhardy, wasteful attacks such 
as Katsuyori's at the Battle of Nagashino (so-called even though the main fighting took place 
some thirty kilometers to the west of Nagashino). 
    SK records that the combined Oda-Tokugawa army had 1,000 guns (not 3,000 as 
claimed in the standard version of the battle). The Takeda army attacked in five separate 
waves and the "majority" (kahansu) of attackers in each wave were cut down exclusively by 
gunfire. There is no mention in SK of the use of any weapons other than guns by the Oda-
Tokugawa army. There is also no mention of the gunners "[firing] in volleys so as to maintain 
a constant barrage," as Geoffrey Parker puts it in his description of the Battle of Nagashino 
quoted earlier. SK speaks of the Takeda as skillful horsemen and refers to their use of horses 
in the battle.63 But we cannot assume that all or even most of the Takeda attackers were 
mounted. In view of the composition of contemporary armies in terms of cavalry and infan-
try, as already discussed, it seems likely that most of them were on foot.64 
    If SK is the most reliable source of primary information about Nobunaga's battles, 
including the Battle of Nagashino, why does the battle's standard version differ so markedly 
from it-that is, why does the standard version include the practice of volley fire and portray 
the battle as an essentially black-and-white, climactic showdown between guns (the new 
style of warfare) and horses (the old style)? The standard version derives from a seventeenth-
century work by Oze Hoan (1564-1640) named Shincho ki, which is actually a substantially 
fictionalized, romanticized version of SK.65 Easy to read and exciting, Shincho ki became the 
equivalent, for its time, of a best seller; and, as Fujimoto Masayuki points out, later writers, 
describing Nobunaga's battles, used it, rather than SK, as their source. In the modern age, 
Oze Hoan's version of the Battle of Nagashino was canonized by the General Staff of the Japa-
nese Army in its publication in 1910 of Nihon senshi (The History of Warfare in Japan). Only 
recently have scholars begun to make extensive use of SK and thus to give a more accurate 
picture of Nagashino and Nobunaga's other battles.     'There is no question that Nobunaga was a major innovator in Japan's age of early mod-
ern warfare. He (along with others) made important use of the power of gunfire on a large 
scale; he was one of the leaders in dividing an army into specialized units of gunners, bow-
men, and spearmen; and he vastly increased the scope and duration of warfare. But we can-
not, on the basis of existing records, go so far as to credit him with being the first, in either 
Japan or Europe, to develop synchronized volley fire with a large unit of gunners. And al-
though his victory at Nagashino was a great victory indeed (it marked the beginning of the 
end for the famous Takeda family), it is misleading to characterize it as an epochal conflict-a 
turning point in Japanese warfare-when guns prevailed over horses. That is a romantic idea 
derived from Oze Hoan's Shincho ki. The Oda-Tokugawa army certainly won with guns, but 
not because the Takeda eschewed these weapons and were determined to stick with cavalry 
to the bitter end, as Shincho ki suggests. The Takeda used guns from the time of Shingen, 
but, like many Sengoku daimyo families, were unable to obtain them in great quantity; and, 
as suggested, many of the Takeda at Nagashino probably fought on foot, as was the general
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custom in this age. 
    I conclude that guns definitely altered the course of warfare in sixteenth-century Japan 
during a period of several decades, effecting either a "military revolution" or a "military evolu-
tion," depending upon how one defines these terms. A prerequisite to the study of this revolu-
tion/evolution is abandonment of the incorrect standard version of the Battle of Nagashino, 
which has long been given such prominence in both amateur and professional analyses of 
warfare in Japan's early modern age.
REFERENCES
Atsuta1991
AtsutaK6熱 田 公.Tenkaitt?V 下 一 統Sh琇iSha,1991.
Conlan2003
Th・masC・nlan.5競げ%π 乃 所 ・lentOrderofFourteenth一(麩turyJapan.Ann
Arbor:CenterforJ瀾aneseStudies,UniversityofMichigan,2003.
Cooper1965
MichaelCooper,ed.TheyCametoJapan.UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1965.
Fujimoto1993
Fujim・toMasaγuki藤 本 正 行.Nobunagan。seng。kugunjigaku:SenjutsukaOda
Nobunaganojitsuz?M長 の 戦 国 軍 事 学:戦 術 家 織 田 信 長 の 実 像.Jlcc
Shuppankyoku,1993.
Imatani1992
1mataniAkira今 谷 明.ハ 励o褫o々 〃伽 踟 〃z勿 日 本 国 王 と 土 民.Sh6gakukan,1992.
Kajihara1967
KajiharaMasaaki梶 原 正 昭.飾 彡々繝oηo即 ㈱ 平 家 物 語.K6dansha,1967.
Kawai1996
KawaiYasushi川 合 康(ﾎenpeika∬ennokyoz?hagu源平 合 戦 の 虚 像 を 剥 ぐ.
K?ansha,1996.
Knuutin.d.
KeithP.Knuuti."PickinguptheGun?TheImpactofFirearmsonJapanandNorth-
eastAsia."Unpublishedpaper,nodate.
Kuwataetal.1988
KuwataTadachika桑田 忠 親etal.,eds.Sengokuka∬en-eby?ush皛ei戦国 合 戦 絵
屏 風 集 成.2vols.Ch顗K?onSha,1988.
Needhametal.1986
JosephNeedhametal.ScienceandCivilizationinChina.vol.5,part7:MilitaryTech-
nology:TheGunpowderEpic.CambridgeUniversityPress,1986.
Owada1978
0wadaTetsuo小 和 田 哲 男.Sengokuduimy??国 大 名.Ky?kuSha,1978.
OdaNobunaga,Guns,andEarlyModernWarfareinJapan121
0wada1995
.Sengokuj珒ai-ka∬ennonazo戦国10大 合 戦 の 謎.PHP,1995.
Parker1988
GeoffreyParker.TheMilitaryRevolution.CambridgeUniversityPress,1988.
Roberts1995
MichaelRoberts."TheMilitaryRevolution.1560-1660."InCliffordJ.Rogers,ed.
TheMilitaryRev・lutionDebate:Readings・ntheMilitary:伽吻 叨4孟加 げ 伽 ウM・ 泌
ernEurope.Boulder:WestviewPress,1995,pp.13-36.
Rogers1995a
CliffordJ.Rogers,ed.TheMilitaryRevolutionDebate.Boulder:WesrviewPress,1995.
Rogers1995b
."TheMilitaryRevolutioninHistoryandHistoriography."InCliffordJ.
Rogers,ed.TheMilitaryRevolutionDebate.Boulder:WestviewPress,1995,pp.1-12.
Sansom1961
GeorgeSansom.AHistoryofJapan,1334-161S.Vol.2.StanfordUniversityPress,
1961.
Sat?965
Sat6Shin'ichi佐 藤 進 一.Nanb・ku-ch?・d?an南北 朝 の 動 乱.Ch顗K?・nSha,
1965.
Shinch?i1972
0zeHoan小 瀬 甫 庵Shinch?i信 長 記.KotenBunko,1972.vol.2.
SK1965
KuwataTadachika,ed.Shinch?麑?i信長 公 記JinbutsuOraiSha,1965.
Sugiyama1965
SugiyamaHiroshi杉山 洋.56卿 〃々露 吻 δ戦 国 大 名.Ch顗K?onSha,1965.
Suzuki1997
SuzukiMasaya鈴 木 真 哉.Tepp?oNihonjin鉄砲 と 日本 人.Y?ensha,1997.
Suzuki1998
.Sengokuka.∬ennokyojitsu戦国 合 戦 の 虚 実.K6dansha,1gg8.
Tepp?i1936
Tepp?i鉄 砲 記.InOkam・toYoshit・mo岡本 良 知.J皞okuseikiNichi一ﾔk?s皛hi
nokenky繒¥ 六 世 紀 日 欧 交 通 史 の 研 究.K6buns6,1936.
Tsunodaetal.1958
RyusakuTsunoda,Wm.T.deBary,andDonaldKeene,eds.SourcesofJapaneseTradi-
tion.ColumbiaUniversityPress,1958.
Udagawa1990
UdagawaTakehisa宇田 川 武 久.Tepp?evrai鉄 砲 伝 来.Ch顗K?・nSha,1990.
122 Paul VARLEY
Varley 1999 
    Paul Varley. "Warfare in Japan 1467-1600." In Jeremy Black, ed. War in the Early 
    Modern World 1450-1815. Boulder: Westview Press, 1999. P. 53-86.
NOTES
1 'This account of the introduction of European guns to Japan is taken from "Teppo ki" (Chronicle of 
the Gun), a portion of which is translated into English in Tsunoda et al. 1958, pp. 317-21. 
2 Sansom 1961, pp. 263-64. 
3 Sansom does state in a footnote (p. 264), however, that the use of guns "greatly speeded up the ten-
dency to make less use of mounted men and more use of infantry, so that within a generation or so 
the use of mounted men had been virtually abandoned." 
4 The "military revolution" debate among historians of medieval and early modern Europe began 
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